Timothy Ryan O’Leary was charged with two counts of violating Florida Statute 836.10 for what he wrote on his personal page. Under the statute, a person who “writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication… containing a threat to kill or to do bodily injury to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent,” commits a second-degree felony. The same holds true if the threatening communication is sent to a family member of the person being threatened. 

O’Leary referred to one of his relatives and her partner by name in a Facebook post where he lambasted them for their sexual preference and then threatened to “tear the concrete up with your face and drag you back to your doorstep,” among other things. Neither he relative or her partner discovered the post on O’Leary’s page, but O’Leary’s cousin, who was Facebook friends with O’Leary, saw the threatening post and relayed the content of the post to the victims. The trial judge ruled that O’Leary could be convicted of violating the statute by virtue of his threatening Facebook post, even though the post was received only by the victim’s family member.

On appeal, the appellate court confirmed that a person can violate Florida Statute 836.10 through Facebook activity. The panel of judges found it immaterial that O’Leary never asked anyone to view the post and never addressed it to anyone.  The court reasoned that by posting his threats directed to his family member and her partner on his Facebook page, it was reasonable to presume that O’Leary wished to communicate that information to all of his Facebook friends, including the victim’s family members with whom he was Facebook friends.

The trial court sentenced O’Leary to 10 years imprisonment followed by two years of community control upon release. The maximum he could have received is 15 years.

Volume VI, Issue 20

May 18, 2013

Manuel Farach

Hagood v. Wells Fargo N.A., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 2112432 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

An issue not raised in the Initial Brief on Appeal is waived.

Saltzman v. Hadlock, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 2113799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

A party who loses a trial de novo after an unfavorable arbitration decision under Fla. Stat. § 44.1036 (6), may become (but is not necessarily) obligated for attorneys’ fees.

Sas v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 2120264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A witness without personal knowledge may not testify as to the contents of a business record if the record is not first admitted into evidence. Accordingly, a lender’s witness may not testify about amounts due according to business records without the records being in evidence.

Humphrey v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 2121729 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A trial court has no jurisdiction over a person who has not been properly served. Accordingly, a trial court that quashes a subpoena on a defendant may not then require the defendant to provide their correct address.

Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Phillips, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 2096252 (Fla. 2013).

Florida’s statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. § 95.011, applies to arbitration actions.

City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 2096257 (Fla. 2013).

Notwithstanding their home rule powers, municipalities may not create code enforcement liens that have superpriority over previously filed interests of record.

East Coast Metal Decks, Inc. v. Boran Craig Barber Engel Const. Co., Inc., — So.3d —, 2013 WL 1979058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

Parties to construction litigation may be bound by the venue provisions in their contracts notwithstanding the construction project is physically located elsewhere.

Saver v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1979824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

If standing is raised as a defense and foreclosing plaintiff is the not the original obligee on the note, plaintiff must establish how it had standing on suit date.

Bengal Motor Co., Ltd. v. Cuello, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1980147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Unless it is expressly conditioned on financing approval from a third party, TILA is impacted when a consumer signs a Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC) notwithstanding later declination by the third party financier. However, no damages are awardable if consumer never actually paid any finance charges.

Greenspoon Marder, P.A. v. Moscoso, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1980255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Charging lien is enforceable for hourly, non-contingent portions of an unpaid fee even when lawyer withdraws without cause before occurrence of contingency.

Miami-Dade County v. Concrete Structures, Inc., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1980420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Aggrieved party that signed consent agreement to avoid administrative penalties for environmental violations is not entitled to an injunction prohibiting warrantless searches by governmental unit (to determine whether there is compliance with agreement) when aggrieved party has adequate remedy at law.

Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., — S.Ct. —-, 2013 WL 1942393 (2013).

“Defalcation” under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (4) involves a culpable state of mind of knowledge or gross recklessness with regard to actions inconsistent with fiduciary duty.

Bowman v. Monsanto Co., — S.Ct. —-, 2013 WL 1942397 (2013).

The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine does not permit a farmer to save seeds from one planting season for use in another in violation of a licensing agreement.

Misty VanHorn, a mother of two in Oklahoma, was arrested last month for alleged trafficking of minors on Facebook by offering her 10-month old and her 2 year-old for $4,000. According to the police report, VanHorn offered the kids several times on the social network — offering the 10-month old girl for $1,000, or a package deal with the two of them for $4,000. And she apparently had a taker. 

“Just come to Sallisaw, it’s only 30 minutes away and I’ll give you all of her stuff and let y’all have her forever for $1,000,” read VanHorn’s Facebook message to the Fort Smith woman, as unearthed in the police report by the Daily Dot.

Ironically, police believe VanHorn wanted the $1,000 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. Now she’s being held on a $40,000 bond. The children are in the custody of the state’s department of human services, which alerted the police in the first place.

It amazes me the things people will say and do on social media. Last year, I reported on a woman who was arrested for allegedly attempting to hire a hitman over Facebook to murder the father of her child. This is yet another example of how what you say on social media can (and will) be used against you.

The Rules of Evidence require that evidence must first be “authenticated” prior to be admitted at trial. It requires a showing that the evidence in question is what its proponent claims. In other words, it must be reliable and overcome any reasonable question that the evidence has been fabricated. 

Social media sites present unique challenges for authentication. Since social media profiles can be easily created by anyone with an email address and some spare time, questions often arise as to whether the social media profile offered into evidence is the actual profile of a party in litigation or whether a particular communication was sent by a party as opposed to someone else who may have had access to their profile. Based on the uncertainty of the reliability of someone’s purported social media profile, admitting social media content into evidence is not as easy as pointing to someone’s Facebook profile bearing their name and photograph to establish the identity of the individual associated with the social media account.

In an instance of what Judge Glenn T. Harrell Jr. of Maryland’s highest court has described as the “technological heebie jeebies,” several recent courts have required more, expressing concern with false profiles, account hacking, and “Photoshopping.”  Recent cases illustrate that litigants may use the indelible digital trail left by users of social media, their digital devices, or obtained directly from the social media provider to help authenticate social media evidence.

The classic case of disputing ownership of social media postings and messages were addresses in two recent cases: Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) and State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). In these cases, courts were sympathetic to claims of falsely created accounts or “hacked” messages. The Griffin court held that “the date of birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site” was insufficient to authenticate the purported owner’s authorship of a message. Similarly, Eleck held that authenticity was not established by “the fact that [the claimed author] held and managed the account.”

Nevertheless, as Eleck noted, “the circumstantial evidence that tends to authenticate a communication is somewhat unique to each medium”; both cases pointed to forensic examination of devices or validation by social media providers as potential means of authenticating such evidence. As use of these methods of authentication becomes more widespread, it seems likely that courts will not look favorably upon evidence put forth without forensic support.

At the same time, traditional means of authentication, such as the distinctive content of a statement, retain force in the world of social media. In Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), Texas’s highest criminal court upheld a murder conviction that relied heavily on postings from several MySpace accounts attributed to the defendant—despite the lack of any forensic evidence or outside authentication. After describing in detail several dozen messages, photographs, and other details linking the profiles to the defendant, the court ruled that the remote possibility “that the [defendant] was the victim of some elaborate and ongoing conspiracy” went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The Tienda court did cite Griffin, however, for the suggestion that in future cases, proponents of social media evidence would be well advised to include extrinsic proof of authenticity.

While these cases begin to provide some clarity as to what courts may require to authenticate social media content, there is still no clear standard that has emerged across all jurisdictions. These cases simply represent the tip of the iceberg. The lesson that can be taken away from these cases is that, more likely than not, courts will require more information than simply the social media user’s name, profile picture, and date of birth to confirm the authenticity of the profile. The more information to support the inference that the social media content is of the user that it purports to be, the better.

Volume VI, Issue 18

May 4, 2013

Manuel Farach

Muntzing v. Global Discoveries Ltd., LLC, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1844268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

A mortgagee (or its assignee) claiming surplus proceeds from a tax deed sale need not produce the original promissory note to claim the proceeds; a notarized statement and a valid lien are the only items required under the statute.

Dobek v. City of Minneola, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1844271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

A latent ambiguity (i.e., the contract language is clear but extraneous facts or circumstances create need for interpretation between possible different meanings) can require evidence be taken with regard to a general release’s intent.

Stone v. BankUnited, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1845584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A lender may prove standing by means other than a dated allonge; standing may be proven circumstantially by payments made by a borrower after assignment, a purchase and assumption agreement, and by the method of servicing the loan.

McColman v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1810583 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

While a plaintiff moving for summary judgment before the defendant answers bears a higher burden, the rule is not absolute and a defendant may not raise this rule while sitting on their rights (e.g., failing to file answer after court orders defendant to do so).

Kalb v. Sail Condominium Ass’n, Inc., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1810642 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Motions under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 must be filed within one year of the date of final judgment sought to be avoided or modified.

B&B Tree Service, Inc. v. Tampa Crane & Body, Inc., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1810761 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

Claims for loss of use require a different measure of damages than lost profits as lost profits must have been in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at time of contract.

Dan Euser Waterarchitecture, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1810768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

An out of state corporate defendant need not produce its corporate representative in Florida absent it seeking affirmative relief in the state or extraordinary circumstances.

Fisher Island Ltd. v. Fisher Island Investments, Inc., Slip Copy, 2013 WL 1831728 (11th Cir. 2013).

Bankruptcy courts, being Article II courts, have a different standard for standing than Article III courts. The bankruptcy court “person aggrieved” test requires a higher causal link between the act and injury in order to establish standing.

Dolphin LLC v. WCI Communities, Inc., Slip Copy, 2013 WL 1831737 (11th Cir. 2013).

A common sales force between two developments, even if both developments are owned by the same parent company, is not sufficient to constitute a “common marketing plan” so as to aggregate separate developments and subject an otherwise exempt development to the requirements of the Interstate Land Sales Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701– 1720.

The man, Richard Godbehere, posted the clip in February under the title “Let’s Go Driving, Drinking!” to LiveLeak, a video-sharing site where users can vote on and donate to videos they like.

Even so, he appeared surprised when police showed up at his house in Kapa’a, Hawaii, to arrest him on charges of consuming alcohol while operating a vehicle and driving without a license.

Social networks offer platforms for us to share everything on the Internet, from our relationship statuses to our political leanings and photos of our pets and children. But some people are discovering that what they share on Facebook, Twitter and other platforms constitutes evidence that can be used against them in a court of law.

“It’s like that old saying,” said professor Susan Rozelle, who teaches evidence and criminal law at Stetson University College of Law in Gulfport, Florida. “Don’t put anything on your Facebook page you wouldn’t tell your mother, or the local police department.”

What people say and do on social media can certainly be used against them in civil and criminal proceedings. While there are legal hurdles to introduce social media evidence in court, such as proving the evidence is “authentic” and not inadmissible hearsay, more and more courts are allowing social media evidence to make or break a party’s case (or, as we see here, provide the grounds for an arrest). 

Volume VI, Issue 17

April 27, 2013

Manuel Farach

Walther v. Ossinsky & Cathcart, P.A., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1775510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

A charging lien requires “(1) an express or implied contract between attorney and client; (2) an express or implied understanding for payment of attorneys’ fees out of the recovery; (3) either an avoidance of payment or a dispute as to the amount of fees; and (4) timely notice.” Since a charging lien attaches only to the fruits of the services, the  attorney must produce a positive outcome to which attach the charging lien.

Marcus v. Florida Bagels, LLC, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Equitable estoppel principles hold that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot compel the signatories into arbitration when they choose not to arbitrate.

DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Fox, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748537 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

A trial court retains jurisdiction to find waiver for failure to file a privilege log, but waiver should not apply to categorical privileges such as the attorney-client privilege.

America Atlantic Transmission v. Nice Car, Inc., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

A lienholder, as opposed to a statutorily defined “customer” (owner) of a vehicle, is not entitled to release of a motor vehicle notwithstanding it has posted bond under Fla. Stat. § 559.917(1)(a) for the repair costs.

Heller v. Blue Aerospace, LLC, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Equitable estoppel principles hold that a signatory to an arbitration clause may compel arbitration against a non-signatory when the signatory raises allegations of concerted conduct by the non-signatory and signatories to the contract.

Hillsboro Management, LLC v. Pagono, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla.1995), holds that juror non-disclosure during voir dire will result in new trial when the withheld information is relevant and material in the case, juror conceals the information during questioning, and the failure to disclose is not due to complaining party’s lack of diligence. A juror’s prior litigation is material, concealment need not be intentional, and the technological ease with which counsel may access information impacts the question of diligence.

Herman v. Intracoastal Cardiology Center, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748634 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2013).

Dismissal for fraud on the court is proper only in the most extreme of circumstances, and actions or non-disclosure must be relevant to the issues in the case. What constitutes fraud on the court rests in the sound discretion of the court, but disputed issues of material fact typically do not constitute fraud on the court.

Atlantis Estate Acquisitions, Inc. v. DePierro, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The full rental payment for a period, even if it is for the period of one year, means the rental payment is not “advance rent” under Fla. Stat. § 83.43 (9) and need not be segregated in a separate account under the Landlord Tenant Act. A tenant that pays for an entire year but is properly evicted under the Act before the end of the rental period may not claim the unused rental period as an “unjust enrichment” to the landlord.

Kritikos v. Andersen, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1748678 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The proper measure of damages for defective construction work that has been corrected is the actual cost of repair; the proper measure of damages for defective work that has not been corrected is the anticipated cost of correction.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bohatka, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1715439 (Fla., 1st DCA 2013).

A trial court may not by-pass normal evidentiary principles by examining a promissory note at the motion to dismiss stage to determine whether it is an

Volume VI, Issue 16

April 20, 2013

Manuel Farach

Walker v. Ruot, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1687878 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

A defendant employer has no privacy rights in an employee’s personnel file, but may object to its production that the requested discovery is not relevant to the litigation.

S.W. Florida Paradise Property, Inc. v. Segelke, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A default during the main part of case does not waive the right to defend or object during post judgment proceedings.

Zodiac Records Inc. v. Choice Environmental Services, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Former customer relationships are not trade secrets unless they are product of great effort and expense and consist of confidential (not publicly available) information.

Chanin v. Feigenheimer, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629154 (Fla. 4th 2013).

A family court judge has jurisdiction to hear fraud, FDUTPA and negligence claims against third parties.

Cromarty v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

An undated blank indorsement does not, without more, establish that a plaintiff has standing at the time of filing a mortgage foreclosure suit.

Southfields of Palm Beach Polo and Country Club Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. McCullough, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

A community association has a duty, which can be enforced by mandatory injunction and mandamus if necessary, to file those documents under Fla. Stat. 712.05 of the Marketable Record Title Act to preserve the community’s restrictive covenants.

Cobb v. Durando, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A proposal for settlement must apportion between joint plaintiffs, even if the joint plaintiffs are married and even if their claim derives from real property owned as tenants by the entireties.

Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Kraz, LLC, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A FDIC “shared loss agreement” does not constitute “payment” of a defaulted mortgage loan such that the loan is not in default and a foreclosure cannot be prosecuted.

Foley v. Wilson, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

A circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction is satisifed with a good faith claim of $15,000.

Swanky Apps, LLC v. Roony Invest & Finance, S.A., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1629250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Telephone and e-mail communications while a person is temporarily in Florida are insufficient minimum contacts to constitutionally exercise long arm jurisdiction.

In re Thomas, Slip Copy, 2013 WL 1579872 (11th Cir. 2013).

Proceeds from a post-petition real estate “short sale” are property of the estate even if the closing emanated from a pre-petition contract.

In re Northlake Foods, Inc., Slip Copy, 2013 WL 1603442 (11th Cir. 2013).

A dividend payment required to be made under a shareholders’ agreement, in this case to pay for taxes that might be imposed on the shareholders, is not a fraudulent transfer in that the company received reasonably equivalent value by virtue of the Subchapter S election.

Merle Wood & Associates, Inc. v. Trinity Yachts, LLC, — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 1501928 (11th Cir. 2013).

The statute of limitations for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment begins to run when a benefit is conferred. Accordingly, the statute begins to run when a broker introduces prospective customers to a manufacturer and assists in the sale of yachts to cu

Volume VI, Issue 14

April 6, 2013

Manuel Farach

Flescher v. Oak Run Associates, Ltd., — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1348134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

A developer may draft association covenants so that developer retains the absolute right to change provisions, but changes are subject to reasonableness requirement that character of development not be changed or burden on members increased.

U. S. Bank, N.A. v. Wanio-Moore, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1348245 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110 (b)’s verification requirement for mortgage foreclosures does not require the signer’s position be stated in order to be valid.

Green v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1348399 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

Foreclosing lender does not prove it had standing on filing date by relying on physical possession of original note which has blank and undated indorsement. Additionally, mortgagor making payments after transfer of note does not automatically defeat defense of failure to comply with the servicer transfer notification requirements  of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) and (2)(B).

Hunt v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co., — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1352471 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A claimant does not need to have prevailed on a breach of a contract claim before filing a “bad faith notice” against its insurer under Fla. Stat. § 624.155.

Malamud v. Syprett, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1352474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

Claim for unjust enrichment is not barred when a cause of action for breach of contract also exists. Additionally, the direct benefit required for unjust enrichment may result from the actions of principals, and not just corporate entities.

Patrowicz v. Wolff, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1352488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

A trial court errs, and certiorari will lie, for orders compelling discovery over objections of privilege and without first conducting an in camera review of the documents.

In Re: Amendments To Florida Rule Of Judicial Administration 2.516, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1338033 (Fla. 2013).

The Florida Supreme Court claries Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 to reflect that parties are required to serve court papers by e-mail (but may stipulate to opt out of doing so), and to clarify that a separate designation of e-mail address is not necessary.

Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Grosso, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1316001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

It is an abuse of a trial court’s discretion to certify a class with an order that does not contain findings of fact upon which the certification is made.

Florida Eurocars, Inc. v. Pecorak, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1316115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

There must be a “timely application” to vacate a default, and the length and reason of delay are analyzed to see whether the application was “timely filed.” The delay occasioned by attempting to amicably resolve the dispute with opposing counsel (i.e., without filing a motion) constitutes a justifiable reason for delay in filing the petition.

LK Group Holding Co. v. Spurrier Investments, Inc., — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1316134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

An eviction which is reversed on appeal is not ipso facto a wrongful eviction.

Vocelle & Berg, L.L.P. v. IMG Citrus, Inc., — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1316329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The following language creates a clear property interest in an escrow account held by a third party such that judgment creditor cannot garnish the account:

For ten dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged, the undersigned hereby assigns, transfers and delivers to Vocelle & Berg, L.L.P., all sums owned by the undersigned, due or which shall become due and owing to the undersigned from [the escrow agent] as escrow agent of the Escrow Agreement dated April 1, 2010 and Escrow Agreement dated April 1, 2010, attached as Exhibit “A” by reason of a certain agreement dated October 7, 2012 by and between the undersigned and Paul R. Berg, Esquire and Vocelle & Berg, LLP attached as Exhibit “B.”

Gutierrez v. Rubio, — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1316383 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

A trial court must make a factual determination confidential information was actually disclosed and that this information gives the non-moving party an unfair tactical advantage in order to disqualify counsel; this determination must be based on actual testimony and cannot be based solely on conflicts affidavits or the arguments of counsel.

Kalmanowitz v. Amerada Hess Corp., — So. 3d  —-, 2013 WL 1316392 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The Relation Back Doctrine is to be liberally construed to allow complaints to be amended, even if the statute of limitations has run, when the “original pleading gives fair notice of the general fact situation out of which the claim or defense arises.”

Jossfolk v. United Property & Cas. Ins. Co., — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1136315 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
The Florida Arbitration Code does not apply to insurance appraisal procedures.

Carriage Hills Condominium, Inc. v. JBH Roofing & Constructors, Inc., — So.3d —, 2013 WL 1136399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
The testimony of a witness noticed for deposition as the “person with most knowledge” will not necessarily bind the witness’s organization if the deposition is not noticed in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310 (b) (6).

Whitney v. Milien, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1136409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
In order to overturn a jury verdict, the “totality of all errors and improprieties” must be “pervasive enough to raise doubts as to the overall fairness of the trial court proceedings.”

South Beach Mortg. and Inv. Corp. v. Levine, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1136441 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
The time period in which mortgagee is entitled to interest on funds held in supersedeas bond runs from date when trial court overrules purchaser’s objections until disbursement of sale proceeds to mortgagee.

Mauna Loa Investments, LLC v. Santiago, — So.3d —-, 2013 WL 1136448 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
A final judgment must be vacated when the complaint upon which it is based fails to state a cause of action, notwithstanding there was a default. Accordingly, a final judgment for a slip and fall must be vacated when the recorded deeds demonstrate the defendant was not the owner on the date of accident.

Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, — S.Ct. —-, 2013 WL 1104735 (2013).
A party representative may not bind a class prior to certification. Accordingly, a class-action plaintiff may not exclude an action from the Class Action and Fairness Act of 2005 by stipulating that he and the class he seeks to represent will not seek damages that exceed $5 million in total.

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., — S.Ct. —-, 2013 WL 1104736 (2013).
The First Sale Doctrine, as codified in the Copyright Act, applies to copies lawfully made outside the United States.